Restating the  Original Source Exception  To the False Claims Act\u27s  Public Disclosure Bar  In Light of the 2010 Amendments by Hesch, Joel D.
University of Richmond Law Review 
Volume 51 Issue 4 Article 5 
5-1-2017 
Restating the "Original Source Exception" To the False Claims 
Act's "Public Disclosure Bar" In Light of the 2010 Amendments 
Joel D. Hesch 
Liberty University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Legislation 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joel D. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception" To the False Claims Act's "Public Disclosure Bar" 
In Light of the 2010 Amendments, 51 U. Rich. L. Rev. 991 (2017). 
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol51/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu. 
RESTATING THE "ORIGINAL SOURCE EXCEPTION" TO
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT'S "PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
BAR" IN LIGHT OF THE 2010 AMENDMENTS
Joel D. Hesch *
INTRODUCTION
Government spending is at an all-time high, and with it so is
fraud against the government. As much as 10 percent of every
dollar spent on government programs is lost to fraud, which
amounts to over $350 billion a year.' Because the government is
ill-equipped to detect fraud, Congress employs a unique qui tam
enforcement provision within the False Claims Act (the "FCA") to
recover such ill-gotten gains.2 Under the FCA, a whistleblower,
known as a "relator," is eligible for a reward by filing a qui tam
civil suit on behalf of the government against a company or per-
son that has defrauded the government.3 If the case is successful,
* Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. J.D., 1988, The Catholic Univer-
sity of America.
From 1990 through mid-2006, Mr. Hesch was a trial attorney with the Civil Fraud Sec-
tion of the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., which is the office responsible for
nationwide administration of the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act ("FCA"). The
author handled FCA and qui tam cases throughout the nation in many different circuits,
including the trial aspects of Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007).
Mr. Hesch extends a special note of thanks to his research assistants, Whitney Ruther-
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article.
1. Joel D. Hesch, It Takes Time: The Need to Extend the Seal Period for Qui Tam
Complaints Filed Under the False Claims Act, 38 SEATTLE L. REV. 901, 904 (2015) [here-
inafter Hesch, It Takes Time].
2. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012). "Qui tam is short for 'qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,' which means 'who pursues this action on our
Lord the King's behalf as well as his own."' Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S.
457, 463 n.2 (2007), superseded by statute, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-48, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901-02 (2010), as recognized in United
States ex rel Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist., 842 F.3d 430, 435 (6th
Cir. 2016).
3. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012); see also Mark Kleiman, Qui Tam and Whistleblower
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a relator is awarded a portion of the recovery, which is typically
between 15 percent and 30 percent of any recovery.'
The qui tam provisions have become the most effective method
of combatting fraud against the government.5 As of 2016, the gov-
ernment had collected $53 billion under the FCA since 1987, of
which over $37 billion was the result of qui tam suits by whistle-
blowers.6 In short, 70 percent of all fraud cases pursued by the
government are the result of qui tam cases.7 Stated another way,
without whistleblowers, the government would not have detected
the fraud, let alone recovered money, in 70 percent of its fraud
8
cases.
To avoid needlessly paying awards when the government is al-
ready hot on the trail of fraud, Congress inserted a "public disclo-
sure bar" into the qui tam provisions.9 The public disclosure bar
prevents a private individual from pursuing a case and obtaining
an award when fraud allegations have already been publicly dis-
closed in certain ways specified in the FCA before a relator files a
qui tam suit.1" At the same time, Congress recognized that there
remains valid reasons for enlisting a relator in certain circum-
stances even when the public disclosure bar is triggered." Thus,
as of 1986, the FCA contains an "original source" exception to the
public disclosure bar.2 If a relator can satisfy the original source
exception, she remains eligible for a reward even if the heart of
the allegations have been publicly disclosed.3
4. Id.
5. See Joel D. Hesch, The False Claims Act Creates a "Zone of Protection" That Bars
Suits Against Employees Who Report Fraud Against the Government, 62 DRAKE L. REV.
361, 363-64 & nn. 3-7 (2014).
6. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS-OVERVIEW: OCT. 1, 1987-SEPr. 30, 2016




9. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat.
3153, 3157 (1986) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2012)).
10. See id.
11. See id.; Erin Campbell et al., The False Claims Act: Protecting Your Client When
Amending a Sealed Complaint, A.B.A. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litiga
tion/committeesfbusinesstorts/articles/winter20l4-0227-false-claims-act-protecting-your-
client-when-amending-sealed-complaint.html.




Tension exists between the public disclosure bar and original
source exception. On the one hand, paying rewards is the single
most effective way to enlist whistleblowers and dramatically in-
creases the total fraud recoveries. On the other hand, every dollar
paid to a relator reduces the amount of the government's recov-
ery. Congress has tried several times to find the perfect balance
between these competing interests.14 In 1943, Congress actually
killed the golden goose by barring qui tam cases when the gov-
ernment had any knowledge of the fraud allegations." As a re-
sult, very few qui tam cases were filed." In response to escalating
fraud, in 1986, Congress scrapped the so-called "government
knowledge bar" and replaced it with the "public disclosure bar,"
which focused not on what the government might have known but
on what was publicly disclosed prior to the filing of a qui tam.7
Importantly, to avoid a similar paucity of qui tams, Congress
simultaneously created the "original source exception" to the pub-
lic disclosure bar.8 The 1986 version permitted a relator to pro-
ceed if she had "direct and independent knowledge" of the fraud,
rather than simply learning about the fraud from certain public
disclosures, such as disclosures in the news media.9 This new
paradigm opened the floodgates and marked a turning point in
the war against fraud. The 1986 qui tam provisions quickly be-
came the most powerful tool"' in the government's arsenal and ac-
counts for 70 percent of all fraud recoveries.2' Consequently, the
14. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649
(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Seeking the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle-
blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of opportunistic
plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their own, Congress has fre-
quently altered its course in drafting and amending the qui tam provisions since initial
passage of the FCA over a century ago.").
15. See Joel D. Hesch, Breaking the Siege: Restoring Equity and Statutory Intent to the
Process of Determining Qui Tam Relator Awards Under the False Claims Act, 29 THOMAS
M. COOLEYL. REV. 217, 231 (2012) [hereinafter Hesch, Breaking the Siege].
16. Id.
17. See Joel D. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception" to the False Claims
Act's 'Public Disclosure Bar," 1 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 111, 116-18, 120 (2006) [hereinafter
Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception'].
18. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 100 Stat. at 3157; see Hesch, Restating
the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 117.
19. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 100 Stat. at 3157.
20. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 267
(5th Cir. 2010). "The FCA is the Government's 'primary litigation tool' for recovering loss-
es resulting from fraud." Id. at 267 (quoting United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos.,
520 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2008)).
21. See FRAUD STATISTICS-OVERVIEW, supra note 6.
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qui tam provisions, and in particular the original source excep-
tion, also became a hotly contested and litigated issue.
Congress acted again in 2010 because some courts too narrowly
interpreted the public disclosure bar and original source excep-
tion. In addition to allowing the government to waive the public
disclosure bar altogether, the 2010 amendment rewrote the origi-
nal source exception.22 The 2010 original source exception can be
met in one of two ways: either (1) a relator told the government
about the fraud before a qualifying public disclosure, or (2) a rela-
tor's information is "independent of and materially adds" to the
public disclosure." Although the first standard seems fairly
straightforward, there remain a few nuances that need clarifica-
tion. The second standard has an element of subjectivity that re-
quires deeper assessment. Because qui tam cases remain the
most important anti-fraud tool, assuring that the original source
exception is properly interpreted and applied is critical.
Since 2010, a handful of courts have ruled on certain aspects of
the new original source exception; however, there remains con-
siderable uncertainty and a need for a full and uniform set of
standards. This article addresses the boundaries and application
of the 2010 version of the original source exception. It begins by
discussing the history of the public disclosure bar and original
source exception. Next, it outlines the statutory framework for
meeting the 2010 original source exception, including a discussion
of how the courts have interpreted these provisions. The last part
proposes tests and a uniform standard to aid the courts and prac-
titioners in applying the 2010 amendments to the original source
exception.
22. Compare Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901-02 (2010) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(a) (2012)), with
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1988).
23. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012).
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I. THE FALSE CLAIMs ACT: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE
ORIGINAL SOURCE EXCEPTION
A. The False Claims Act Background
24
Throughout history, government programs have been plagued
by fraud. Even today, "[n]early 10% of all federal government
spending is lost due to fraud.25 In 1863, Congress first tackled
this problem by enacting the False Claims Act 2s due to rampant
fraud during the Civil War, such as the military receiving sand
instead of sugar.27 The FCA not only imposed multiple damages
and penalties for defrauding the government,28 but also took the
extraordinary step of paying rewards to whistleblowers that file
qui tam complaints to report fraud against the government.9 Es-
sentially, a private person, known as a "relator," files a qui tam
lawsuit on behalf of the government.° If the case is successful, a
relator is entitled to a share of the proceeds, which today ranges
from 15 percent to 30 percent.1 Qui tam cases have become a vi-
tal aspect of the government's civil fraud recovery, accounting for
70 percent of all government recoveries.2
1. The 1863 FCA and Early Abuses
As first enacted in 1863, the qui tam provisions had a gaping
hole that the Executive Branch argued was being exploited by
24. See Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 116-18,
for a more detailed discussion of the history of the FCA.
25. Hesch, It Takes Time, supra note 1, at 904; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-496, at 69
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1869 ("According to the General Accounting
Office (GAO), as much as 10 percent of total health care costs are lost to fraudulent or
abusive practices by unscrupulous health care providers."); S. REP. No. 99-345, at 3 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268 ('The Department of Justice has estimated
fraud as draining 1 to 10 percent of the entire Federal budget.").
26. See Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 15, at 230-33, for a discussion of the
history of the FCA.
27. See 132 CONG. REC. 29,321 (1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman); Hesch, Breaking
the Siege, supra note 15, at 224; see generally False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733
(2012).
28. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(G) (2012).
29. See id. § 3730(b). Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17,
at 118-19 (detailing the function and purpose of the qui tam provisions).
30. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception, supra note 17, at 112 n.6.
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012); see also Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Excep-
tion," supra note 17, at 112-13.
32. See Hesch., Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 112.
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some relators in the 1940s. The relators found that they could ob-
tain an award based simply upon filing a civil qui tam case that
mirrored a criminal complaint in the public domain. The Supreme
Court, in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, ruled that this
practice was not barred by the FCA. The Court determined that
the statute did not contain any restrictions on filing based upon
publicly available information. In reaction, Congress rushed to
amend the FCA.33
2. The 1943 Amendments and the "Government Knowledge Bar"
In 1943, Congress amended the FCA to include a "government
knowledge bar.' 4 The FCA was amended "to provide that there
would be no jurisdiction over qui tam suits 'whenever it shall be
made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or infor-
mation in the possession of the United States, or any agency, of-
ficer or employee thereof, at the time such suit was brought."'35
"According to the courts, this new provision created a complete
bar to all qui tam suits where any information about the fraud
was already somewhere in the possession of the government.36
Unfortunately, the measure was too drastic and "killed the
goose that laid the golden egg.''37 In practice, the government
knowledge bar prevented any qui tam suit in which the govern-
ment already possessed at least some of the information alleged
in the qui tam case. The 1943 amendments certainly put an end
33. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 545 (1943).
34. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 116.
35. Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032,
1041 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1946); S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 12 (1986)).
36. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 117; see also
Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1041. The Seventh Circuit decision in Wis-
consin v. Dean, where the State of Wisconsin was barred from bringing a qui tam suit
based on Medicaid fraud which it had disclosed to the federal government, ruled that the
1943 amendments to the FCA barred the qui tam suit, notwithstanding that it was the
State who reported the matter to the federal government. 276 F.3d at 1041. The relator
was barred because it filed suit after the federal government was told of the fraud allega-
tions. Id.
37. See United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Emps'. Club, 105 F.3d 675, 680
(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("But it soon became apparent that by restricting qui tam suits by indi-
viduals who brought fraudulent activity to the government's attention, Congress had
killed the goose that laid the golden egg and eliminated the financial incentive to expose
frauds against he government. The use of qui tam suits as a weapon for fighting fraud




to filing qui tam suits based upon publicly available criminal
complaints. However, it also put an end to the qui tam practice
because good cases were swept up with the abuses.39 Relators
were unwilling to face the risks of whistleblowing when the gov-
ernment could simply turn the case away by claiming that some
government employee or document in its files contained some
hint of the fraud.4 ° Therefore, there were only a handful of qui
tam cases from 1943 until Congress amended the FCA in 1986.41
3. The 1986 Amendments Creating the "Public Disclosure Bar"
and "Original Source Exception"
In the 1980s, Congress once again realized the great need for
relators. Fraud was rampant and reminiscent of the days of the
Civil War when contractors provided the military with sand in-
stead of sugar.42 For instance, the military was now being bilked
by being charged "$600 for toilet seats and $748 for pliers."4
Thus, in 1986, Congress amended the FCA as an appeal for help
by providing greater incentives for and protections of whistle-
blowers." The solution was two-fold. First, Congress replaced the
"government knowledge bar' 45 with the "public disclosure bar."4
The new approach was to bar qui tams only when the information
already had been publicly disclosed in certain situations, rather
than focusing upon what the government might have known.47
Second, the 1986 amendments also created the "original source
39. See id.
40. James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REv. 1261, 1270 (2013). Prior to
filing a qui tam, the relator simply had no way of knowing if or what the government
knew.
41. Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 15, at 232 ("[F]rom 1943 to 1986, 'there
were fewer than six FCA suits brought per year[.]"').
42. See id. at 231.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 232.
45. See Minn, Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032,
1041 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1946); S. REP. No. 99-345, at 12 (1986))
(explaining that Congress barred jurisdiction for suits based on information known by
government employees).
46. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat.
3153, 3157 (1986) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012)).
47. Id. § 3, 100 Stat. at 3157; see also Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Excep-
tion,"supra note 17, at 117-18.
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exception"48 to the public disclosure bar, which was intended to
ensure that individuals with valuable information would still be
enlisted and enticed to file a qui tam and help the government
pursue fraud cases."
a. The 1986 Public Disclosure Bar
The 1986 public disclosure bar, which replaced the 1943 gov-
ernment knowledge bar, reads:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section
based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, admin-
istrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is brought
by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an orig-
inal source of the information.5 0
In short, the bar was triggered only by a qualifying public dis-
closure; namely, the fraud51 had to be disclosed in one of the spe-
cifically enumerated manners identified in this provision. If there
was no qualifying public disclosure prior to the filing of a qui tam
complaint, the bar did not apply and a relator need not have met
the original source exception.
b. The 1986 Original Source Exception
The 1986 amendments also created the "original source excep-
tion" 2 to the public disclosure bar, which was intended to ensure
that individuals with valuable information would still file and
48. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 100 Stat. at 3157.
49. See Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 117-18.
50. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 3, 100 Stat. 3153,
3157 (1986) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2012)).
51. See id. In addition, to be considered "substantially the same allegations or trans-
actions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed," the critical or material
elements of the allegations or transactions of the qui tam complaint must appear in the
public disclosure. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012). That means that the public disclo-
sure must have alleged fraud either with respect to the same allegations or transaction in
the qui tam complaint or contained information essential about the same transactions or
allegations to reach the conclusion that a fraud had occurred. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Congress
sought to prohibit qui tam actions only when either the allegation of fraud or the critical
elements of the fraudulent transaction themselves were in the public domain.").
52. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 100 Stat. at 3157 (current version at
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B)).
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proceed in qui tam cases.3 This provision reads: "For purposes of
this paragraph, 'original source' means an individual who has di-
rect and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the infor-
mation to the Government before filing an action under this sec-
tion which is based on the information.
Assuming that a qualifying public disclosure occurred prior to
the filing of a qui tam complaint, the FCA's 1986 original source
exception expressly permitted a relator to pursue the suit if she
had "direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action[.]"55 In the-
ory, the "public disclosure bar" and "original source exception" are
designed to work together to allow whistleblowers who contribute
valuable information despite fraud allegations having been pub-
licly disclosed.56 However, courts varied widely in interpreting the
1986 original source exception, creating various circuit splits.7
For instance, some apply "either a two- or three- part test for
measuring the original source prong,"58 but even more problemat-
53. See Quinn, 14 F.3d at 649 (explaining that the 1986 amendments aimed for "the
golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely
valuable information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no signifi-
cant information to contribute of their own").
54. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 100 Stat at 3157.
55. Id.
56. Cf. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 121
("[Mhere is danger in summarizing the statute as containing 'dual goals of encouraging
whistle-blowers while discouraging parasitic suit[s].' There are many problems with such
broad statements. First, the qui tam statute is not limited to 'whistleblowers' and there is
no requirement that a relator be an 'insider' or ever have even worked for the wrongdoer.
In addition, outside of the parameters of the public disclosure bar setting, the FCA does
not limit a qui tam complaint unless a FCA suit has already been filed by the government
or another relator. Moreover, the statute does not address 'parasitic' behavior in most in-
stances, and it has no place under the statute unless the 'public disclosure bar' has been
triggered.").
57. Id. at 122-28 (discussing the various approaches used by the circuits and restat-
ing how the original source exception should be applied); Joel D. Hesch, Understanding the
"Original Source Exception" to the False Claims Act's 'Public Disclosure Bar" in Light of
the Supreme Court's Ruling in Rockwell v. United States, 7 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 1, 1-
4 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court's resolution of one circuit split, but also identifying
additional areas of dispute) [hereinafter Hesch, Understanding the "Original Source Ex-
ception"].
58. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 125. The Su-
preme Court, while not addressing the original source split, did, however, outline a three-
prong test for the 1986 Public Disclosure bar: (1) whether there was a "public disclosure"
of allegations or transactions, (2) whether the qui tam action was "based upon" such pub-
20171
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ic was that the courts differed greatly in defining the terms "di-
rect" and "independent."5 As a result, there was an unresolved
circuit split.
In some ways, the public disclosure bar still kept the door
closed too tightly to attract all the whistleblowers that Congress
wanted to incentivize. According to one court, "[a]lthough the
original public disclosure bar was less restrictive than the gov-
ernment knowledge defense, it was by no means a low bar for re-
lators to clear. Indeed, given its broad language, as well as differ-
ent courts' varying interpretations of that language, relators
faced a formidable hurdle."" Therefore, in 2010, Congress would
take another stab at crafting the public disclosure bar and origi-
nal source exception in hopes of finding the perfect balance.
II. ANALYZING THE 2010 AMENDMENTS
In 2010, Congress amended both the public disclosure bar and
the original source exception of the False Claims Act." There
were material changes made to each section designed to loosen
the requirements in order to find the right balance.62 With respect
to the public disclosure bar, it applies only to information con-
tained in one of the specified ways in the statute, which are de-
noted as qualifying public disclosures. Thus, the public disclosure
bar only applies if a qualifying public disclosure occurs before a
qui tam complaint is filed. One change was that a disclosure in "a
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing now qualifies as a public
disclosure only if the information was disclosed in a federal case
to which the government was a party."6 As a result, information
that was disclosed in a federal case between private parties no
licly disclosed allegations, and (3) if so, whether the relator qualified as an "original
source." Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 559 U.S. 280, 286
(2010). The Court did not address or define the terms direct or independent from the orig-
inal source exception. See id. at 286 n.4.
59. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 128-32.
60. United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A_ v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d
294, 298 (3d Cir. 2016).
61. See id. at 298.
62. See id. at 299.
63. Id. at 299, 304 (emphasis added) ("[comparing] 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006)
(listing a 'criminal, civil, or administrative hearing' as a public disclosure source), with id.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A)(i) (2012) (listing 'a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in
which the Government or its agent is a party' as a public disclosure source)").
1000 [Vol. 51:991
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longer constitutes publicly disclosed information. Congress also
amended the statute to ensure that the bar is no longer "jurisdic-
tional" and expressly gave the government unilateral authority to
object to and block dismissal based upon the public disclosure
bar.64
With respect to the original source exception, Congress not only
dropped the requirement that a relator have direct knowledge of
the fraud, but also essentially rewrote the entire provision. The
2010 original source exception can be met if either a relator told
the government about the fraud before a qualifying public disclo-
sure occurred or a relator's information was independent from the
public disclosure and materially adds to the public disclosure.65
Altogether, there are now three ways for a relator to avoid the
public disclosure bar: (1) the government opposes dismissal; (2) a
relator reported the fraud allegations to the government prior to
a qualifying public disclosure; or (3) a relator provides infor-
mation that is independent from and materially adds to the in-
formation contained in a qualifying public disclosure.66 Each is
discussed below.
A. The Government May Oppose Dismissal Under the Public
Disclosure Bar
With respect to the public disclosure bar, one thing Congress
set out to do was to undo a ruling by the Supreme Court in Rock-
well International Corp. v. United States.67 In Rockwell, the Court
held that the public disclosure bar was a jurisdictional require-
ment that neither the government nor the court could waive.66 In
that case, although a relator had filed and been assisting the gov-
ernment for many years in a hotly litigated qui tam case, which
64. Id. at 300.
65. Id. at 297 (discussing how Congress "removed the language that explicitly stated
that a court was deprived of 'jurisdiction' over the FCA action if the bar applied to that
action; reduced the number of enumerated public disclosure sources; and expanded the
definition of 'original source' by allowing a relator who 'materially adds' to the publicly
disclosed information to qualify").
66. See id. at 298.
67. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 476 (2007), superseded by
statute, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 101046j)(2), 124
Stat. 119, 901-02 (2010).
68. See id. at 467-68. The author was one of the Department of Justice trial attorneys
in this case.
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ultimately went to trial and survived numerous appeals, the Su-
preme Court dismissed the relator from the case because he could
not satisfy the 1986 original source exception.69 The Court held it
was irrelevant that the relator reported the fraud to the govern-
ment prior to the public disclosure and was the source of the pub-
lic disclosure." The Court also held that the government's inter-
vention in the case did not save the relator because it was
jurisdictional.'
In 2010, Congress amended the FCA to remove the jurisdic-
tional bar element of the public disclosure bar.72 In its amended
form, the 2010 public disclosure bar provides:
The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless
opposed by the Government, if substantially the same allegations or
transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly dis-
closed-(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in
which the Government or its agent is a party; (ii) in a congressional,
Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report, hearing,
audit, or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless the ac-
tion is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information.
By inserting "unless opposed by the government," Congress
erased the jurisdictional impact of the bar. On its face, this lan-
guage mandates that if the government submits to the court a
written opposition to any motion to dismiss an action or claim
under the public disclosure bar, the court shall not dismiss the
action or claim even if the allegations or transactions had been
publicly disclosed. In short, the government in its sole discretion
may waive the public disclosure bar. Every circuit court that has
considered this question has agreed that the public disclosure bar
is no longer jurisdictional.74 In short, when the government op-
69. Id. at 470, 475-76.
70. Id. at 475-76.
71. Id. at 476-77. The Court did permit the Government to continue with the case.
72. Compare Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No 111-148, §
10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 901-02 (2010) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012)), with
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 100 Stat. at 3157.
73. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. at 901-02 (em-
phasis added).
74. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC,
812 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2016) ("[Jloin[ing] the other circuits that have ruled that the
amended version does not set forth a jurisdictional bar."); United States ex rel. Osheroff v.
Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 2015) ("We conclude that the amended §
3730(e)(4) creates grounds for dismissal for failure to state a claim rather than for lack of
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poses dismissal, a relator need not meet the original source ex-
ception.
B. The 2010 Original Source Exception
Regarding the original source exception, Congress fundamen-
tally shifted the language and paradigm of the original source ex-
ception by redefining how a relator can satisfy the original source
requirement. The 2010 amendment reads:
For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individu-
al who either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection
(e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the infor-
mation on which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or
(2) [sic] who has knowledge that is independent of and materially
adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who
has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before
71
filing an action under this section.
"Although no direct legislative history seems to exist, the textual
changes alone evince Congress's intent to lower the bar for rela-
tors, at least as to some of its components."76 One of the signifi-
cant changes included doing away with the "direct knowledge"
requirement because it was not only vague, but also untenable at
achieving the purpose of the FCA."7 The "original source status
now turns on whether the relator has 'knowledge that is inde-
pendent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allega-
tions or transactions."'7 8 The focus now is on what independent
knowledge the relator has added to what was publicly disclosed.79
Under the 2010 original source exception, there are two complete-
ly different paths with slightly different purposes for achieving
original source status."0 A relator, however, need satisfy only one
of the two in order to remain in the case.81
jurisdiction.'); United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 916 (4th
Cir. 2013) ("It is apparent... that the public-disclosure bar is no longer jurisdictional.").
75. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat, at 901-02.
76. Moore, 812 F.3d at 299.
77. United States ex rel. Bogina v. Medline Indus., Inc., 809 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir.
2016).
78. Moore, 812 F.3d at 299.
79. Id.
80. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 10104(j)(2), 124 Stat. at 901-02.
81. Id.
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The first method is a bright-line test that automatically grants
original source status if a relator approached the government
with fraud allegations prior to a qualifying public disclosure.8 2 Es-
sentially, if a relator reported the fraud to the government prior
to a qualifying public disclosure but files her qui tam suit after
such public disclosure, there is no requirement that she prove
that her qui tam complaint was not based wholly or in part upon
information the FCA considers publicly disclosed information83
She is credited because she was not initially prompted by what
she learned through a public disclosure. The second method ap-
plies when a relator waited until after a qualifying public disclo-
sure to contact the government to report fraud and requires eval-
uating the value of the information.84 Both are discussed below.
1. Disclosing to the Government Prior to a Qualifying Public
Disclosure
The first way a relator may satisfy the 2010 original source ex-
ception is if she discloses the fraud allegations to the government
prior to a qualifying public disclosure.85 The pertinent language
reads: "'original source' means an individual who.., prior to a
public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily dis-
closed to the Government the information on which allegations or
transactions in a claim are based.86
There are four prongs to this standard: (1) the disclosure must
be prior to a qualifying public disclosure; (2) the disclosure must
be to the government; (3) the disclosure must be voluntary; and
(4) the disclosure must include information on which the allega-
tions or transactions in a claim are based.8" When all four are sat-










a. The Disclosure Must Be Prior to a Qualifying Public
Disclosure
The newly added manner of establishing original source status
simply requires that a relator inform the government of the fraud
allegations prior to a qualifying public disclosure.9 The starting
point is the precise public disclosure. As an initial matter, if there
is no qualifying public disclosure prior to filing of a qui tam com-
plaint, the public disclosure bar does not even apply, and thus,
the original source exception need not be met.' Similarly, if there
is information in the public domain that was not disclosed in one
of the requirements specified by the bar, then no qualifying public
disclosure occurred.91
Assuming that a qualifying public disclosure occurred prior to
the filing of a qui tam, a relator meets the first prong of the origi-
nal source exception if she informed the government of the fraud
allegations prior to such qualifying public disclosure.92 No longer
must a relator file the qui tam suit prior to the public disclosure,
or even be the one who caused the public disclosure, as required
by a few courts under the 1986 version.93
In the past, assuming a relator called or wrote a letter telling
the government of a fraud scheme prior to any public disclosure,
but did not file a qui tam case until after a public disclosure, a re-
lator would need to prove that her information met the exacting
requirements that she both had direct and independent
knowledge, even if she was the one who triggered the government
investigation or public disclosure.94 This was precisely the issue in
the Rockwell case.95 In Rockwell, the whistleblower contacted the
FBI and the government initiated an investigation.96 Prior to fil-




92. See Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 126--27.
93. See id. at 148 n.187, 148-52.
94. Rockwell Intl Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 476 (2007), superseded by
statute, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10104(j)(2), 124
Stat. 119, 901-02 (2010).
95. Id. at 466-67. The author was one of the Department of Justice trial attorneys in
this case.
96. Id. at 461-62.
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were based on information provided by a relator.97 Therefore, the
public disclosure bar was triggered, and the relator was required
to establish direct and independent knowledge of the fraud not-
withstanding that he was the person that prompted the govern-
ment's investigation. The Court held that the relator's knowledge
of the fraud was second-hand and therefore he was not an origi-
nal source as defined by the FCA, even though he triggered both
the investigation and the public disclosure and thus there would
not have been any recovery without him reporting the fraud.98
The 2010 version now contains a bright-line test that exempts
altogether any relator who reports the fraud to the government
prior to a qualifying public disclosure.99 This new standard was
intentionally made both automatic and simple to accomplish the
purpose of rewarding whistleblowers for stepping forward prior to
a qualifying public disclosure.
100
b. The Disclosure Must Be to the Government
The first method of becoming an original source also requires
that a relator disclose the fraud to "the government."'01 It would
not be sufficient to report the fraud internally to her employer or
to the news media. Rather, this provision requires that a relator
report the allegations to the government prior to a qualifying
public disclosure.112 The statute does not specify the manner in
which a relator should inform the government, but requires only
that the disclosure occur.'3 There are many ways to disclose in-
formation, including calling a hotline, writing a letter, or meeting
97. Id. at 462-63.
98. Id. at 475-76.
99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 101040)(2), 124 Stat. at 901-02; see
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). The 2010 original source exception
no longer contains the requirement of direct knowledge. "[I]f substantially the same alle-
gations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed in a federal
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party;
in a congressional, Government Accountability Office or other federal report, hearing, au-
dit, or investigation; or from the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the information." See id.
100. Joel D. Hesch, The False Claims Act Creates a "Zone of Protection" that Bars Suits
Against Employees Wlho Report Fraud Against the Government, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 376
(2014).





in person with a government employee. As far as which govern-
ment official, the FCA does not contain any specific requirement
or name any particular officials beyond requiring that it be to the
government.' Thus, a relator need not contact a specific govern-
ment official, such as the Attorney General or United States At-
torney. Rather, the government includes any government official.
Again, the focus of this exception is the timing of the disclosure. If
the relator reported the fraud to the government prior to a public
disclosure, she is an original source.
c. The Disclosure Must Be Voluntary
Next, a relator must have "voluntarily disclosed to the Gov-
ernment the information on which allegations or transactions in a
claim are based."'0' The statute does not define "voluntarily."'0 6
Although not controlling because it addressed a different version
of the statute with a different purpose, the legislative history of
the 1986 original source exception offers some guidance by indi-
cating that a relator "voluntarily" discloses information if she was
not compelled by subpoena and did not disclose the information
only as a result of being subpoenaed.' In United States ex rel.
Stone v. Am West Savings Ass'n, '0 the district court when address-
104. Id.
105. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Because this is a new provision, care must be taken when ap-
plying legislative history relating to a prior version of a statute even as to the same or sim-
ilar words because it is used in a new context and approach. Congress obviously intended
this new provision to be both automatic and simple; therefore, courts should not merely
apply the same meaning to the word voluntary as used in older cases interpreting the pri-
or version. Thus, a dictionary definition of the term voluntary should be used. See infra
note 113. Nevertheless, this article points out the meaning of the term in the context of
the old statute.
106. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B).
107. 132 CONG. REC. 20,536 (1986) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (explaining that the
requirement was intended "to preclude the ability of an individual to sue under the qui
tam section of the False Claims Act when his suit is based solely on public information and
the individual was a source of the allegations only because the individual was subpoenaed
to come forward. However, those persons who have been contacted or questioned by the
Government or by the news media and cooperated by providing information which later
led to a public disclosure would be considered to have 'voluntarily' informed the Govern-
ment or media and therefore considered eligible qui tam relators"); see also United States
ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that information pro-
vided in response to a subpoena is not voluntary); United States ex rel. Repko v. Guthrie
Clinic, P.C., No. 11-3682, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15870, at *5- (3d Cir. June 5, 2012)
(finding the information was not voluntary because providing it was part of the plea deal
that compelled the disclosure).
108. 999 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
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ing the 1986 version explained "the relator must prove that his
disclosure was made 'of [his] own free will without valuable con-
sideration... [or] without any present legal obligation.., or any
such obligation that can accrue from the existing state of af-
fairs."'1 9 In that case, the relator made a disclosure in exchange
for a grant of immunity from criminal prosecution prior to filing a
qui tam suit relating to the information he disclosed."' The court
concluded that his disclosure was not voluntary because he dis-
closed the information in exchange for valuable consideration,
namely, immunity."'
One court applying the 1986 version, however, incorrectly ruled
that if the only disclosures made to the government prior to filing
were responses to interviews initiated by the government, as part
of an ongoing investigation, then the disclosure is not volun-
tary."2 This treatment of "voluntarily" is misplaced, even under
the 1986 version. The court appears to have improperly used this
prong to address whether the relator triggered the investigation,
rather than upon the voluntariness of the witness.
This article proposes that under the 2010 original source excep-
tion, voluntarily simply means not compelled by law."' Indeed, a
witness being asked interview questions by a government inves-
tigator could refuse to meet or disclose information absent a sub-
poena. Thus, a relator's choice to meet with an investigator and
reveal fraud during the interview meets the definition of volun-
109. Id. at 857 (quoting United States ex rel. Fione v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d
740, 744 (9th Cir. 1995)).
110. Id.at857-58.
111. Id.
112. United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 704 (8th Cir.
1995) (holding that a relator who responded to a HUD investigator's interview questions
had not voluntarily provided information to the Government before filing suit). There is
also a split in the circuits regarding whether a government employee whose duties involve
investigating fraud can ever be considered to have voluntarily provided the information.
Most courts have held that it is not voluntary under those conditions, but at least one cir-
cuit court disagrees. Compare Chevron, 72 F.3d at 744 (explaining that Fine was a gov-
ernment auditor tasked with conducting audits to detect fraud and thus, according to the
court, was paid to report fraud and did not voluntarily provide the information), with
United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Grp., 318 F.3d 1199, 1226 (10th Cir. 2003)
(allowing government employees to be relators because the original source exception does
not prohibit it). For a collection of cases on this topic, see CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 11:67 (2016).
113. Voluntary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vol
untary (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
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tary. The definition of voluntarily does not hinge upon who initi-
ated the meeting. Rather, voluntarily means being made of a per-
son's own free will and without being compelled."4
Classic examples of voluntarily providing information to the
government include contacting the FBI to report fraud, sending a
letter to the government outlining the fraud, and providing the
government with a draft of the qui tam complaint prior to filing.115
Again, however, the key is whether the witness was being com-
pelled to provide the information or did so through their own free
will. Thus, this element should be met in most, if not all, cases in
which there was not a subpoena or plea agreement requiring that
the information be produced. It includes answering questions by a
government agent, even when the government initiated the inter-
view.
d. The Disclosure Must Include Information on Which the
Allegations Are Based
The last prong of the original source exception requires that a
relator had disclosed "the information on which allegations or
transactions in a claim are based."'16 The exception does not re-
quire disclosure of all known details of the fraud, but only that
114. Another court incorrectly held that because the FCA requires a relator to submit a
statement of material evidence ("SME") with the qui tam complaint, she is being com-
pelled to provide the SME and she therefore cannot meet the voluntary element by giving
the government an advance copy of her SME. United States ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi
Training Ctr., Inc., 933 F. Supp. 2d 825, 846 (E.D. Va. 2013) (concluding that disclosures
made to the government two weeks before filing the complaint were made to satisfy §
3730(b)(2) and thus were not voluntary). This is circular reasoning. Moreover, the FCA
does not compel anyone to report fraud. Rather, it establishes how to apply for a reward if
you choose to report fraud. In any event, the FCA does not require providing the SME pri-
or to filing the complaint, but contemporaneously with it. Thus, a relator may still volun-
tarily provide the same information prior to filing a complaint. If that court were correct,
it would nullify the original source exception altogether because a relator must voluntarily
provide information about the fraud allegations to satisfy either original source standard,
and a statute cannot be read in a manner that nullifies an entire provision.
115. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ahumada v. Nish, 756 F.3d 268, 275-76 (4th Cir.
2014) (finding the disclosure voluntary when he told the FBI everything he knew before
filing suit); United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., No. 12-CV-775-UPS, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 40871, at *20-21 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2014) (holding the disclosure to be voluntary
when a letter and draft complaint was sent to the Attorney General); United States ex rel.
Baker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1104 (D.N.M. 2010) (declaring the
disclosure voluntary when a letter was sent to the Department of Justice a month before
filing).
116. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
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the relator approach the government with fraud allegations prior
to a public disclosure.117 Again, this new provision seeks to remove
the subjectivity of the exception. As long as the relator reported
the fraud prior to a qualifying public disclosure, she is conferred
with original source status. Elsewhere in the FCA, a relator is re-
quired to produce a statement of material evidence that discloses
all key facts."8 But that statement is a submission that must be
included with the actual filing of a qui tam. To require a full dis-
closure of the allegations at this stage would essentially defeat
the purpose of this new exception, which rewards a whistleblower
for stepping forward with information prior to a public disclosure.
If the relator was required to turn over all of her evidence, it
would essentially mean she must file a qui tam prior to a public
disclosure. That is not what this new provision was intended to
require."9 In fact, it put to death the few court decisions that re-
quired filing of a qui tam suit prior to the public disclosure or
even being the one who caused the public disclosure.2 '
The 2010 original source exception was designed to automati-
cally grant original source status to anyone that approached the
government with fraud allegations prior to a qualifying public
disclosure.2' In other words, if a person reported fraud to the gov-
ernment prior to a public disclosure, they could not have possibly
acted upon or been motivated by a public disclosure. Thus, the
new standard simply requires that a relator have stepped forward
with fraud allegations prior to a qualifying public disclosure. In
fact, this special exemption is divorced from both the prior 1986
requirement that a relator possess direct and independent
knowledge of fraud and the 2010 alternative method of establish-
117. See United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201,
208-09 (lst Cir. 2016) ('The ultimate inquiry, of course, is whether the government has
received fair notice, prior to the suit, about the potential existence of the fraud.").
118. § 3730(b)(2) (requiring that at the time of the filing of a qui tam, the relator also
serve on the government "[a] copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially
all material evidence and information the person possesses").
119. See United States ex rel. Moore & Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d
294, 299 (3rd Cir. 2016).
120. See Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 144-52
(detailing and critiquing several cases that were in conflict with the new standards im-
plemented in the 2010 provisions).
121. See Moore, 812 F.3d at 299.
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ing original source status in which she must show how she ac-
quired the information and the usefulness of it."'
Based upon the purpose of the new provision and the clear lan-
guage in the text, which does not contain any quantum or level of
information that must be disclosed prior to the public disclosure,
all a relator is required to do is report to the government that it is
being defrauded and disclose the basis of her allegations. Thus, it
does not require that she produce every piece of information she
possesses, but only that she approached the government to report
fraud prior to the public disclosure. For instance, a relator may
send a one-paragraph email to a government official outlining the
fraud against the government. The government certainly can ask
for more details or set up an interview if it wants more details at
that time, but the purpose of the original source exception is
merely to weed out relators that show up after reading a qualify-
ing public disclosure versus those that contacted the government
with information about the fraud before such public disclosure.
Therefore, the amount of information is not the focal point, but
rather the timing. With respect to qui tam practice, it would be
sufficient for a relator's legal counsel to send a short e-mail to an
Assistant United States Attorney informing that official of the re-
lator's intention to file a qui tam and briefly outline the fraud al-
legations. As long as a relator informed the government of the
fraud allegations prior to a qualifying public disclosure, she is an
original source.
2. Knowledge That Is Independent of and Materially Adds to the
Publicly Disclosed Allegations
The second way a relator may satisfy the 2010 original source
exception is if she possesses knowledge that is "independent of
and materially adds" to the publicly disclosed information. The
pertinent language reads: 'original source' means an individu-
al... who has knowledge that is independent of and materially
122. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988) (original source "means an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based . . .'), with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(b) (2012) (original source "means an individual
who . . . prior to a public disclosure .. . has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the
information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are based[.]").
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adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who
has voluntarily provided the information to the Government be-
fore filing an action under this section.'
123
There are three components to this method of being considered
an original source: (1) knowledge that is "independent of' the
qualifying public disclosure; (2) knowledge that "materially adds"
to the qualifying public disclosure; and (3) voluntarily providing
information to the government before filing the qui tam com-
plaint.124 Each requirement is discussed below.
a. "Independent of' the Publicly Disclosed Allegations
The first prong requires "knowledge that is independent of...
the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions.""' 5 Although it
did not define the term "independent of," the statute used this
term in a manner different from the 1986 version, which had re-
quired "independent knowledge.""' 6 Because Congress reworded
the language after a circuit split,"27 it is fair to assume Congress
meant something different and hoped to avoid similar confusion.
Thus, although Congress used the same word "independent," it
used a different structure and specifically tied it to the publicly
disclosed allegations or transactions. Therefore, the courts should
not simply adopt prior case law, but revisit their definition of the
term "independent" as used in this new context, and should rule
that it means that a relator's knowledge is not derived from the
public disclosure itself.
123. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 101040)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 119 at 901-
02 (2010) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2012)).
124. Id. § 10104(j)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 902.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Compare id., with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988).
127. There was a circuit split regarding the definition of "independent knowledge" un-
der the prior version of the original source exception. See Hesch, Restating the "Original
Source Exception," supra note 17, at 129-32. For instance, the Tenth Circuit had defined
independent knowledge to mean that the relators' knowledge "must not be derivative of
the information of others," United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Scis., Inc., 99 F.3d 1000,
1007 (10th Cir. 1996); Cf. United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 861-62 (7th
Cir. 1999) (rejecting the Tenth Circuit's interpretation in United States ex rel. Fine v. Ad-
vanced Sciences, Inc.). The Third Circuit ruled that knowledge must not be dependent up-
on publicly disclosed information. See United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
944 F.2d 1149, 1159-60 (3d Cir. 1991). But see United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1519-20 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the interpretation of United
States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co.).
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Courts should begin their analysis with the plain language of
the 2010 statute, which grants original source status if a relator
can show that the source of her knowledge was independent of
any qualifying public disclosures.128 Here is an example. Assume
that the government received an anonymous tip that hospital
XYZ was upcoding Medicare patients to pneumonia when they
really had a cold. The government acts by reviewing billing rec-
ords and concludes that 90 percent of this hospital's Medicare pa-
tients are billed for pneumonia versus the state's average of 30
percent. Assume further that this finding is reported in a federal
government audit report. Assume that a relator works for the
hospital and was in a meeting in which all coders were instructed
to upcode every Medicare patient to pneumonia. In this instance,
a relator would have knowledge of the fraud scheme independent
of the audit report and would therefore satisfy this element. Her
knowledge of an important element of the fraud scheme is based
upon the meeting. Accordingly, she satisfies the "independent of'
the qualifying public disclosure because her knowledge was not
derived from the audit.
Several circuit courts have ruled in this area since the passage
of the 2010 amendments. For instance, in 2016 the Third Circuit,
in United States ex rel. Moore & Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries,'29
after reviewing the evolution of the original source exception and
the changes made in 2010, concluded that the relator's knowledge
need only be independent of the qualifying public disclosure and
not independent from any and all information existing in the pub-
lic domain.'° In that case, the relator was able to show that it
learned of the fraud allegations during discovery in a civil lawsuit
in which the federal government was not a party, and therefore it
128. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 10104(j)(2)(B, 124 Stat. at 902 (cur-
rent version at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2012)).
129. 812 F.3d 294 (2016).
130. Id. at 305 ('This definition therefore states that a relator's knowledge must be in-
dependent of, and materially add to, not all information readily available in the public
domain, but, rather, only information revealed through a public disclosure source in §
3730(e)(4)(A)."). The court also examined the history of the public disclosure bar and stat-
ed, "Congress overhauled the public disclosure bar" when it modified its requirements un-
der the 2010 amendments. Id. at 299. The court concluded that the 2010 amendments'
"textual changes alone evince Congress's intent to lower the bar for relators." Id. The court
also noted that the 2010 original source analysis is significantly different than the analy-
sis conducted before 2010. See id. at 305. The court then addressed the materially added
requirement, which is discussed in the next section. Id. at 306.
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was not derived from a qualifying public disclosure.' Thus, the
court ruled that the relator met the "independent of' standard.'
The Fifth Circuit in Stennett v. Premier Rehabilitation, LLC al-
so briefly addressed the new requirement for "independent
knowledge" under the 2010 amendments.'33 According to the
court:
A relator's "independent" knowledge does not derive by the public
disclosure. Although the relator need not show that he knew about
the fraud before the public disclosures, his prior knowledge of the in-
formation, upon which he based his complaint, may help demon-
strate that he obtained the information independent of the public
disclosure. "Under this approach, we are required to 'look to the fac-
tual subtleties of the case before [us] [sic] and attempt to strike a
balance between those individuals who, with no details regarding its
whereabouts, simply stumble upon a seemingly lucrative nugget and
those actually involved in the process of unearthing important in-
formation about a false or fraudulent claim.'
13 4
The court correctly noted that the focal point is where the rela-
tor derived the information, i.e. from a qualifying public disclo-
sure or another source."' Unfortunately, the court did not further
develop the meaning of the term "independent of' and simply ap-
plied case law interpreting "independent knowledge" from the
1988 original source exception."6 Worse yet, the court cited to a
case using a balancing approach that appeared to weigh the value
of the information rather than focusing solely upon where the in-
formation was obtained."7 Notwithstanding the flawed approach,
the result was correct. Even though the tests for independent
knowledge under the 2010 version of the Act is different from the
1986 version, it was abundantly clear that she did not meet ei-
ther, which helps explain why the court might not have been
careful in distinguishing between the two versions of the Act. In-
deed, the relator's sole source of knowledge was a federal gov-
ernment audit and other documents that clearly were qualifying
131. Id. at 304.
132. Id. at 306.
133. 479 Fed. App'x 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2012).
134. Id. (citations omitted).
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id. (citing United States ex rel. Reagan v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare
Sys., 384 F.3d 168, 177 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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public disclosures.3 ' However, future courts should not view this
case as a signal that it can apply definitions based upon the 1986
version of the Act for qui tams filed under the 2010 version.139
In 2016, the Seventh Circuit also addressed the meaning of
"independent of" the publicly disclosed information.4' This too is a
case that could be misinterpreted. Additionally, this court errone-
ously cited to case law addressing the 1986 independent
knowledge standard before concluding that "a relator's knowledge
of the alleged wrongdoing must not 'derive from or depend upon'
the public disclosure."14' The court continued, "[i]nstead the rela-
tor must be 'someone who would have learned of the allegation or
transactions independently of the public disclosure.""" Although
it cited to cases interpreting the old provision, the court did cor-
rectly state that the test should be based upon the source of the
relator's information. In that case, the court ruled that the rela-
tor's knowledge was not independent of the public disclosure be-
cause the relator conceded that the source of knowledge was a
federal government audit, which clearly constituted a qualifying
public disclosure.' Although this result was also correct, there
remains a danger in relying upon or applying cases that address
the 1986 version of the statute.
In sum, the plain language and meaning of "independent of'
means that a relator's knowledge is not derived from a qualifying
public disclosure itself." That is not the same thing as if a rela-
138. Id. at 636.
139. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 756
F.3d 1075, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2014). In 2014, the Eighth Circuit held that a relator did not
possess independent knowledge because she obtained her information from a FOIA re-
quest. Id.
140. Cause of Action v. Chi. Transit Auth., 815 F.3d 267, 283 (7th Cir. 2016).
141. Id. (quoting United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 864 (7th Cir.
1999)).
142. Id. (quoting Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d at 865) (comparing Glaser v. Wound
Care Consultants, Inc., 570 F.3d 907, 921 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding relator was not an orig-
inal source where her "only knowledge that [the defendant]'s billing practices were im-
proper came from [her attorney], with whom [she] had no prior relationship and who con-
tacted her out of the blue"), with Leveski v. ITT Educ. Serv., Inc., 719 F.3d 818, 837 (7th
Cir. 2013) (holding relater was an original source where knowledge was "personal and
specific to her; it [wa]s not second- or third-hand evidence learned from another source")).
143. Id. The court also ruled that because the allegations were substantially similar to
the prior public disclosure, the relator could not show that its knowledge materially added
to the public disclosure. Id.
144. Hesch, Understanding the "Original Source Exception," supra note 57, at 30 (ap-
plying the 1986 version: "In light of the purpose of the FCA, the most accurate definition of
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tor's fraud allegations are similar to a public disclosure. Indeed, it
is presumed that her allegations are substantially the same as a
qualifying public disclosure or the public disclosure bar would not
apply. The original source inquiry begins and ends with whether
a relator can show that she acquired her information from a
source other than a qualifying public disclosure. She satisfies the
"independent of' requirement if she can show that her knowledge
of an essential element of the fraud was not derived from the pub-
lic disclosure.' She can do this by showing that she learned the
information from a source other than the qualifying public disclo-
sure.
The next prong, namely the "materially added" prong, address-
es any requirement regarding the usefulness or value of the in-
formation.
b. "Materially Adds" to the Publicly Disclosed Allegations
Under the second method, a relator must also demonstrate that
her knowledge "materially adds" to the qualifying public disclo-
sure.4 ' This requirement focuses upon the value of the infor-
mation and whether the whistleblower is providing useful infor-
mation not appearing in a qualifying public disclosure. At the
same time, however, it is not meant to block out relators simply
because there had been a qualifying public disclosure that con-
tains similar allegations. After all, this is designed to be an ex-
ception to the public disclosure bar, which only kicks in if "sub-
stantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the
action or claim were publicly disclosed . ,,."" The Third Circuit
articulated this same point in Moore.'4 8 In that case, the defend-
ants argued that because the essential elements of the fraud were
publicly disclosed, the relator's additional details regarding how
'independent' knowledge is that knowledge must not be derived from or dependent upon the
public disclosure itself.") (emphasis in original).
145. In other words, even if some of the information contained in a qui tam complaint
appears within a public disclosure, a relator still qualifies as an original source if she pos-
sesses information as to an essential element that was obtained independent from a quali-
fying public disclosure.
146. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2012).
147. Id.




the fraud originated or transpired could not be said to "materially
add" to what was already publicly disclosed.' In response, the
court declared:
Yet that cannot be the meaning of the term, for that would read out
of the statute the original source exception. The exception, of course,
comes into play only when some facts regarding the allegation or
transaction have been publicly disclosed. The salient issue, then, is
how to distinguish additional but immaterial information from in-
formation that "materially adds" to the publicly disclosed allegation
or transaction of fraud.15
Thus, the test for "materially adds" cannot be the same as the
test for the public disclosure bar. In other words, merely because
the allegations are substantially the same as a qualifying public
disclosure, a relator still qualifies as an original source if she
brings something to the table that adds value.
Another reason the "materially adds" requirement should not
be too strict a standard is because in any case where it applies, a
relator's qui tam complaint is the first and only FCA proceeding.
Indeed, the "first to file" provisions of the FCA restrict a relator
when either the government5' or another relator has already filed
suit.'52 In other words, the FCA only pays a reward when a relator
is the first one to file a FCA claim as to a particular fraud. In
those instances, a second filed case would be dismissed without
reaching the public disclosure bar. Because the FCA is the gov-
ernment's most important tool for combatting fraud,'53 it is essen-
tial that FCA claims proceed on the merits, and not merely be
dismissed because the government had a theoretical right to
bring its own suit. Thus, courts should not use the public disclo-
149. Id. at 306.
150. Id.
151. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3) ("In no event may a person bring an action under subsection
(b) which is based upon allegations or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or
an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in which the Government is already a
party.'.
152. Id. § 3730(b)(5) ("When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person
other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts un-
derlying the pending action."). This is known as the first to file bar.
153. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 267
(5th Cir. 2010) ('The FCA is the Government's 'primary litigation tool' for recovering loss-
es resulting from fraud."); Avco Corp. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622
(D.C. Cir. 1989) ('The False Claims Act is the government's primary litigative tool for the
recovery of losses sustained as the result of fraud against the government.").
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sure bar to contravene the purpose of the first to file bar, which
only requires dismissal if the government (or another relator) had
already filed a FCA case. In addition, the FCA vests the govern-
ment with the power to unilaterally "dismiss the action notwith-
standing the objections" of a relator.' Thus, if a court is address-
ing the original source exception it means that not only has no
other relator filed suit but also that the government itself has
neither filed its own suit nor moved to dismiss the qui tam com-
plaint. Thus, the structure of the FCA statute demonstrates that
the original source exception is designed to purposefully invite
and entice relators to file a qui tam even after a qualifying public
disclosure has occurred and that contains substantially the same
allegations. The only requirement here is that she demonstrates
the value of her knowledge by showing that it materially adds to
the public disclosure."'
The term "materially adds" from the original source exception
is not defined in the FCA. However, the section outlining liability
under the FCA contains a definition of "material,""' 6 which the Act
itself says "means having a natural tendency to influence, or be
capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or proper-
ty.""' 7 The Supreme Court also recently addressed the meaning of
"materiality" with respect to liability." 8 Specifically, in 2016, the
Supreme Court addressed whether the implied certification theo-
ry of legal falsity under the FCA was viable. In Universal Health
Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, the Court recog-
nized that "[a] misrepresentation about compliance with a statu-
tory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to
the Government's payment decision in order to be actionable un-
154. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
155. In addition, the 2010 original source provision is not intended to resurrect the
1943 government knowledge bar that killed the qui tam practice and prompted the 1986
original source exception. See supra Part I.A.2. The 2010 original source exception is also
intended to be an improvement by lowering the bar for relators, not raising it. United
States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d, 294, 299 (3d
Cir. 2016). Therefore, courts should not apply a standard based upon what the government
knows or whether the allegations are substantially the same.
156. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2012) (declaring that a person is liable under the FCA if
she "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement ma-
terial to a false or fraudulent claim").
157. Id. § 3729(b)(4).




der the False Claims Act."1 9 Accordingly, the Court was required
to define "materiality."
Although the Supreme Court's definition was in a different
context, it nevertheless sheds light upon how the term "material"
should be interpreted in this context. For instance, the Court de-
scribed the general meaning of the term material. Specifically,
the Court noted that "[u]nder any understanding of the concept,
materiality 'look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of
the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.""6 It further noted
that under tort law, a 'matter is material' . . . [if] a reasonable
man would attach importance to [it] in determining his choice of
action in the transaction."'161 With respect to contract law, the
Court cited to Williston for the meaning of material, and noted
that the "'most popular' understanding is 'that a misrepresenta-
tion is material if it concerns a matter to which a reasonable per-
son would attach importance in determining his or her choice of
action with respect to the transaction involved[.]"'' Thus, this ar-
ticle proposes that under the 2010 original source exception, ma-
terially adds means that a reasonable person would attach im-
portance to the information.
A few circuit courts of appeals have tackled the question of
when information adds value or improves the quality of the quali-
fying public disclosure. In 2016, the Third Circuit in Moore began
by rejecting the defendant's argument that merely providing ad-
ditional details of the fraud does not "materially add" because it
only supports the publicly disclosed transactions.63 The court rea-
soned that this "cannot be the meaning of the term, for that
would read out of the statute the original source exception.'6 The
court added, "[t]he salient issue, then, is how to distinguish addi-
tional but immaterial information from information that 'materi-
159. Id. at 1996.
160. Id. at 2002 (quoting 26 RICHARD A. LORD, WtLLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 69:12 (4th
ed. 2003)).
161. Id. at 2002-03 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 538 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
162. Id. at 203 n.5 (quoting 26 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 69:12,
549-50).
163. United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d
294, 306 (3d Cir. 2016).
164. Id. ("The exception, of course, comes into play only when some facts regarding the
allegation or transaction have been publicly disclosed.").
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ally adds' to the publicly disclosed allegation or transaction of
fraud.165
Because the term "materially adds" was not defined by the
FCA, the court turned to dictionary definitions separately for
each word "add" and "material."'66 According to the court, "[t]he
word 'add' means to 'put (something) in or on something else so as
to improve or alter its quality or nature.""67 The court next de-
fined "material" as "significant, influential, or relevant.'' 68 By
combining the two terms, the court concluded: "So to 'materially
add[ ]' to the publicly disclosed allegation or transaction of fraud,
a relator must contribute significant additional information to
that which has been publicly disclosed so as to improve its quali-
ty.,,6
9
In developing a test or standard, the Third Circuit looked to
Rule 9(b)'s pleading requirements, which require the "who, what,
when, where and how of the events at issue[,]" as a "helpful
benchmark for measuring 'materially adds.",170 "Specifically, a re-
lator materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegation or trans-
action of fraud when it contributes information-distinct from
what was publicly disclosed-that adds in a significant way to the
essential factual background: the 'who, what, when, where and
how of the events at issue.""7 '
When applying the standard to the facts of the case, the court
compared the public disclosure to the additional information pro-
vided by the relator to identify what was added. The public dis-
closure consisted of two articles in the media, along with docu-
ments obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, stating
that the defendants made false certifications to the U.S. Coast
Guard in order to obtain licenses to fish under the South Pacific
Tuna Treaty.'72 Specifically, the media published information that
the defendants represented that the fishing vessels were con-
trolled and commanded by United States citizens when in fact
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Add, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2005)).
168. Id. (quoting Material, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2005)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 306-07 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 307.
172. Id. at 301.
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they were not.'73 Thus, a qualifying public disclosure existed.
However, the Third Circuit found that the relator added signifi-
cantly to the publicly disclosed elements of the defendants' fraud
by providing specific details about how the defendants formed a
company using straw United States owners.'74 During civil dis-
covery in a lawsuit in which the government was not a party, the
relator was able to gather specific details as to how the defend-
ants were surreptitiously establishing and controlling a company
by having the sisters of one of the defendants act as straw owners
of two fishing vessels as part of a fraud scheme.7' The relator also
showed that the sisters only capitalized the straw company with
$50 and knew nothing about fishing or the defendants' business-
es.'76 This information went far beyond the basic allegation in the
media that the vessels were not owned and controlled by a United
States citizen.'77 Thus, the court correctly determined that this in-
formation added significant details to the essential factual back-
ground of the fraud, and therefore materially added to the public
disclosure.' Specifically, it is clear that a reasonable person
would attach importance to the information that uncovers how
the fraud scheme works; namely the use of his sisters as straw
purchasers, which evidences intent to defraud.
In 2016, the First Circuit in United States ex rel. Winkelman v.
CVS Caremark Corp. also addressed whether a relator's
knowledge "materially added" to publicly disclosed information.'79
This case provides a good distinction of when adding new infor-
mation is not sufficient to add value necessary to qualify as an
original source. According to the First Circuit:
At its most abecedarian level, an addition is material if it is "[o]f
such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person's de-
cision-making," or if it is "significant," or if it is "essential." This dic-
tionary definition comports with the common law understanding of
"material," which focuses the relevant inquiry on whether a piece of
information is sufficiently important to influence the behavior of the
recipient. As such, our task is to ascertain whether the relators' al-
173. Id.
174. Id. at 307.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 308.
178. Id.
179. 827 F.3d 201, 211 (1st Cir. 2016).
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legedly new information is sufficiently significant or essential so as
to fall into the narrow category of information that materially adds
to what has already been revealed through public disclosures. As the
level of detail in public disclosures increases, the universe of poten-
tially material additions shrinks.8 0
The court went on to caution that even though there is overlap
between materially add and whether a qualifying public disclo-
sure occurred, "the 'materially adds' inquiry must remain concep-
tually distinct; otherwise, the original source exception would be
rendered nugatory."'81 Nevertheless, the court noted that it must
still examine if the relator's allegations are substantially the
same as the public disclosure.182
In Winkelman, the allegations of fraud were publicly disclosed
when a coalition of labor unions issued a report alleging a price-
gouging costing hundreds of millions of dollars by comparing the
HSP drug prices charged by CVS to non-government customers
with the prices charged to the federal government and then testi-
fied before Congress regarding the findings, which were widely
reported in the media."3 A year later, the relator filed suit alleg-
ing a best price violation under the Medicaid Rebate Statute.'8
The relator in Winkelman raised four types of knowledge that
he claimed materially added to the public disclosures.5 First, the
relator argued that the same fraud scheme for the same drugs
was occurring in other states and also violated Medicare Part D. 
8 6
Because it was the exact same fraud scheme as outlined in the
media, with the relator adding only that it was occurring nation-
wide, the court stated that the relator could not plausibly claim
that it materially added to the public disclosure.'87 Although the
result based on this set of facts was correct, care must be used not
180. Id. (citations omitted).
181. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries,
LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2016)); cf. United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech
Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining, under pre-amendment version of
the original source exception, that a relator may sometimes provide "different information
of the publicly disclosed fraud ... of great significance," especially when the public disclo-
sures themselves rely on uncertain or unavailable information).
182. Id. at 213.
183. Id. at 204.
184. Id. at 205.





to extend this case further than required. For instance, expand-
ing the scope of the fraud often can materially add value. In Win-
kelman, the fraud scheme was well-defined in the public disclo-
sure relating to the same drug and thus this relator did not add
value. If, however, there were additional fraud schemes relating
to other drugs, not only would it not likely trigger the public dis-
closure bar, but even assuming it had, producing evidence of
fraud pertaining to other drugs would constitute added value that
a reasonable person would consider important. Similarly, if the
publicly disclosed information reveals fraud at one hospital in a
chain, if a relator brings forth evidence that it is also occurring at
another location, that would also materially add to the disclosure.
Second, the relator alleged that the scheme continued after the
media coverage occurred.188 The court noted that because CVS
publicly argued that its conduct was appropriate, the public dis-
closure indicated that it was ongoing and there was no reason to
think that the practice had stopped, and thus the allegation that
it was continuing did not materially add to the disclosure.189 In
other situations, however, alleging ongoing fraud can materially
add value. For instance, if the evidence in the public disclosure
does not indicate ongoing fraud, such as a prior settlement or
other indicia that the fraud had ceased, then ongoing fraud can
materially add value. The key is whether a reasonable person
would attach importance to the information.
Third, the relator proffered that he added specific examples of
fraud not included in the media reports of price gouging." The
court concluded that the media had already reported that the
price gouging scheme cost the government hundreds of millions of
dollars.19" ' The mere addition of a specific instance of fraudulent
behavior did not materially add to the underlying conduct that
was publicly disclosed.'92 This decision, however, should be lim-
ited to cases where a particular fraud scheme has been publicly
disclosed in such a manner that would satisfy the equivalent of
Rule 9(b). In such cases, merely including additional examples
would not materially add value. Yet, when a public disclosure
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contains only vague allegations, additional details that a reason-
able person would find important would satisfy the original
source exception.
Fourth, and most significant, the relator alleged that he
brought forth evidence of intent.19 The court recognized that evi-
dence of scienter is important and could suffice as a material ad-
dition to information in the public domain.' However, the relator
did not possess true evidence of scienter. For instance, he did not
allege knowledge of any meetings or documents outlining the
company's intent to cheat. Rather, the relator relayed that from
his experience the company was intending to defraud the gov-
ernment. His evidence included that CVS did not try to enforce
certain programs, which was considered a cover for the fraud
scheme, and did not train its employees under that program.195
None of his proffered evidence, however, directly showed intent or
guilty knowledge. Thus, the court did not consider his infor-
mation material in light of the public disclosure that CVS was re-
fusing to provide the lowest price to the government.9 ' In sum,
the court concluded that at most the relator added detail about
the precise manner in which CVS was operating the HSP pro-
gram and that "a relator who merely adds detail or color to previ-
ously disclosed elements of an alleged scheme is not materially
adding to the public disclosures."'97
Although the result in Winkelman was correct and the court
correctly noted that scienter was an important issue when ad-
dressing "materially added," care must be used to ensure this
case is not stretched in the wrong direction. In fact, this article
posits that, regardless of how well defined the fraud allegations
are in a qualifying public disclosure, when a relator brings forth
actual knowledge of scienter it should be presumed to materially
add value. Because FCA cases often turn on the issue of scienter
and since the government is never in a good position to have di-
rect evidence of guilty knowledge, courts should presume that
adding any inside evidence of scienter materially adds to publicly
disclosed information. Even if some details regarding scienter are
193. Id.






in a public disclosure, a relator still satisfies the "materially adds"
requirement by bringing forth other knowledge of scienter. For
instance, if the public disclosure contained information regarding
one internal meeting, but there were other corporate meetings
discussing fraud, knowledge of other meetings likely meets this
test because of the critical need and crucial role scienter plays in
FCA cases.198 The point is that evidence of scienter that is not al-
ready publicly disclosed is highly valued and should be presumed
to materially add value.
At the same time, it is not sufficient for a relator to merely
claim that her information provides evidence of scienter. Again,
the relator in Winkelman did not present true evidence of intent.
The relator did not attend meetings in which fraud was discussed
or produce information pertaining to the formation or inner work-
ings of the fraud scheme. Rather, the relator merely added his
own personal insights and conjecture.'99 Thus, simply claiming
that information helps prove intent is not sufficient.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit rejected the relator's argument
that he was adding value in the form of scienter when in fact he
was only adding his personal views or insights.°0 In United States
ex rel. Paulos v. Stryker Corp., the relator filed suit in 2011 alleg-
ing that the company knew that its pain pumps were causing
chondrolysis°' and failed to disclose danger when applying for
FDA approval or during subsequent sales of the devices.02 The re-
lator conceded that his allegations had previously been publicly
disclosed.2 3 In fact, the issue was raised years earlier when sev-
eral studies were published that eventually linked pain pumps to
chondrolysis.24 The relator, nevertheless, argued that he was an
198. In addition, every employee in a meeting in which the fraud scheme was discussed
would meet the "materially added" requirement. This standard is not intended to address
the issue of multiple relators or who has the best evidence of fraud. Rather, the "first to
file" bar within the FCA mandates that the relator who properly files and meets the
standard is entitled to the award. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012). Thus, courts should not
use the "materially added" prong as a method of weeding out relators merely because
someone else might have stronger information.
199. Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 213.
200. United States ex rel. Paulos v. Stryker Corp., 762 F.3d 688, 695-96 (8th Cir. 2014).
201. Chrondrolysis is a severe type of shoulder arthritis. Id. at 690-91.
202. Id. at 695-96.
203. Id. at 692.
204. Id. at 690. The issue was first raised in the early 2000s, when doctors saw a spike
in the number of patients developing chondrolysis, and questions were raised whether
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original source because he possessed evidence of scienter."° The
court, however, noted that the only information tendered on this
point was a 2005 report by the relator in which he suggested to
Stryker that there might be a causal connection."' The court cor-
rectly ruled that the relator did not materially add to the public
disclosure because (1) the relator provided no meaningful evi-
dence of scienter by merely suggesting a possible connection,"7
and/or (2) the proffered information was already part of the pub-
licly disclosed information linking the pain pumps to chondroly-
sis.2°5 Therefore, a reasonable person would not attach importance
to the fact that in 2005 the relator suspected a connection; this
connection had been established and reported in the media after
extensive studies were not only conducted but reported in the
media prior to the filing of his qui tam suit in 2011.20 If, however,
the relator had attended meetings in which Stryker was discuss-
ing how to conceal studies or lie to the FDA, the result would
have been different. True evidence of intent or guilty knowledge
is the type of information that materially adds value; simply stat-
ing personal views or conjecture does not.
In sum, based upon the statutory text and framework, and con-
sidering the case law, the term "materially adds to the publicly
disclosed allegations or transactions" means that a relator brings
something to the table that adds value21 or improves the quality
of the qualifying public disclosure.2 1' It adds value if a reasonable
person would attach importance to the information. Knowledge
that is considered material can relate to any essential element of
a FCA claim, and includes improving the quality of essential fac-
tual background, such as additional details regarding "the who,
"this spike was related to the use of medical devices known as 'pain pumps' to deliver an-
esthetics via catheter into patients' joint spaces (the area surrounding a joint)." Id. "This
concern triggered several studies on the effects of placing pain pumps in patients' joint
spaces and also bred numerous product liability lawsuits against pain pump manufactur-
ers .. " Id. Eventually, it was concluded and reported that the pain pumps were the
cause. Id. at 694.
205. Id. at 693-94.
206. Id. at 693.
207. Id. at 694.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 694.
210. United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d
294, 298, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2016).
211. Id. at 306.
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what, when, where and how of the events at issue.'212 Thus, a re-
lator materially adds when her knowledge significantly enlarges
the scope of the case.213 In addition, regardless of how well defined
the fraud allegations are in a qualifying public disclosure, when a
relator brings forth knowledge of scienter that is not specifically
contained in a qualifying public disclosure it should be presumed
to materially add value. Because of the critical need and crucial
role scienter plays in FCA cases, a relator who brings new evi-
dence demonstrating that the defendant knowingly submitted a
false claim prima facie meets this standard. For instance, if a re-
lator attended a meeting in which a supervisor discussed the
fraud scheme, then it would significantly add to the allegations,
provided the government did not already have such evidence from
the same meeting.
Returning to the hypothetical raised earlier in this article,"'
even though the government conducted an audit that determined
that hospital XYZ must have been upcoding because 90 percent of
the hospital's Medicare patients are billed for pneumonia versus
the state's average of 30 percent, not only was her knowledge in-
dependent from the disclosure as explained earlier, but she also
clearly had knowledge that materially added to the publicly dis-
closed allegations. Specifically, she provided evidence of scienter
that was not contained in a qualifying public disclosure. Her alle-
gations contained evidence of intent stemming from internal
company meetings with agents of the defendant in which the
fraud scheme was discussed. Her knowledge adds to the available
information about the defendant's scienter, i.e., the knowing
submission of a false claim. This is information not contained in
the audit and not normally available to the government. In short,
when a relator has inside information that shows the company
knew it was submitting false claims, that is prima facie evidence
212. Id. at 307.
213. By itself, merely adding a larger time period or geographic area to an already well-
defined fraud allegation, however, may not meet the materially added standard. Yet, if the
publicly disclosed fraud is not well-defined or does not contain significant details, then
adding new transactions or occurrences would materially add. "As the level of detail in
public disclosures increases, the universe of potentially material additions shrinks." Unit-
ed States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211 (1st Cir. 2016).
Conversely, the smaller the level of detail in a qualifying public disclosure, the more readi-
ly a court should find that a relator's knowledge of additional facts or details materially
adds to the disclosure.
214. See supra Part II.B.2(a).
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that the information meets the requirement of materially adding.
At the same time, it must be more than suspicions, conjecture, or
legal arguments.
c. Notify the Government Before Filing
Finally, under this second method of establishing the original
source exception, not only must a relator have voluntarily provid-
ed the information to the government,216 but there also is lan-
guage that suggests a relator must notify the government of the
fraud allegations before filing the qui tam complaint.216 The stat-
ute reads: 'original source' means an individual ... who has
knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the pub-
licly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntari-
ly provided the information to the Government before filing an ac-
tion under this section."'217 Thus, the statute contains language
suggesting that a relator must contact a government official be-
fore filing a qui tam complaint. Unlike the other original source
exception that hinges upon notifying the government prior to a
public disclosure, there does not appear to be a significant pur-
pose for requiring notification to the government of the fraud be-
fore filing suit under this exception, because this exception hinges
upon the value of the information and not the timing.218 Indeed,
this exception applies in situations in which there was a qualify-
ing public disclosure before contacting the government. Whether
or not the relator gives a heads up that a suit is forthcoming does
not alter that fact or impact whether the information materially
adds value.
There are relatively few cases discussing this point and most
miss the mark. One court, however, understood that even under
the 1986 version this language was not intended to be a gateway
for turning away relators, and has outright dismissed this as a
requirement, stating that if a relator cooperates with the gov-
215. The term "voluntarily" was defined in the discussion of the first manner of meet-
ing the original source exception and that definition also applies here. See supra Part
II.B. 1(c). The disclosure must be voluntary.
216. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012) ("[V]oluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action under this section.") (emphasis added).
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. See id. § 3730(e)(4)(B)(2).
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ernment, the provision's intent is satisfied.219 A few other courts
have erroneously attempted to set some time limits, such as no-
tice a day or week before filing. 22 But those cases are misguided.
Those courts incorrectly view this requirement as giving the gov-
ernment time to investigate the allegation. This assumption is
faulty because "the average time it takes the government to in-
tervene in a case is slightly over three years."22' Thus, if the court
were truly intending to give the government time to investigate
the allegations, it would have to impose a requirement that the
relator wait three years to file a qui tam complaint once inform-
ing the government of the fraud.
The purpose of notifying the government appears to be simply
to alert the government of the upcoming filing of a qui tam com-
plaint so that the government can be ready to promptly begin in-
vestigating the allegations once the qui tam complaint is filed.
This is because the FCA requires service of the complaint under
seal and only upon the Attorney General and the United States
Attorney.2 However, neither of these high-ranking officials actu-
ally conducts the factual inquiry.22 The concern is that the qui
tam complaint, which remains under seal for only sixty days
without a request for more time,224 will get lost in the govern-
ment's mailing system because the Attorney General receives
219. United States ex rel. Ervin & Assocs. v. Hamilton Secs. Grp., Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d
1, 10 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Hesch, Understanding the "Original Source Exception," supra
note 57, at 34 ('There does not appear to be much value in demanding any prior notice,
but if required, it should be very limited.").
220. See, e.g., United States ex rel. King v. Solvay S.A, No. H-06-2662, 2015 U.S. Dist.
25132, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2015). A few courts have stated it cannot be simultaneous
with filing the qui tam. E.g., United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, 166
F.3d 853, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1999).
221. Hesch, It Takes Time, supra note 1, at 931. "In reality, it often takes between
three and six years for the government to properly investigate and bring a complex fraud
case that satisfies Rule 9(b) and fulfills the duty to conduct a parallel criminal investiga-
tion without prematurely or wrongfully accusing a company of defrauding the govern-
ment." Id. at 903. ("In short, the actual investigation period for cases in which the gov-
ernment intervenes can take three years for standard cases and six years for large and
complex cases, and even as much as eight years in a [sic] rare situations.'). Id. at 917.
222. Id. This article explains in detail the entire procedural process of the government's
investigation.
223. See id. at 917-18 (explaining the delegation process).
224. According to the FCA, the qui tam complaint must be filed under seal and served
only upon the Attorney General and United States Attorney. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2012).
The FCA provides an initial sixty day seal period for the government to evaluate the fraud
allegations. Id. To obtain longer than sixty days the government must file an ex parte ap-
plication asking the court for additional time. Id. § 3730(b)(3).
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hundreds, if not thousands, of mailings each day."5 In addition,
the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. must determine
whether to delegate certain cases to the United States Attorney's
Office.2 Thus, the purpose of this language in the statute ap-
pears to be merely to notify the government that a qui tam com-
plaint is about to be filed to merely ensure it can more quickly be
distributed to the attorneys actually conducting the investiga-
tion.27
In short, even assuming there is a requirement that a relator
notify the government before filing, it means that a relator's dis-
closure may occur at any time before filing the qui tam suit. The
term "before" means "during the period of time preceding (a par-
ticular event, date, or time)." '' Therefore, a relator satisfies the
"before" aspect of the original source exception if she notifies the
government of fraud at any time before filing her qui tam com-
plaint, even if it is only minutes before.229 Since the FCA does not
impose any length of time requirement for such disclosures other
than "before," courts should not impose their own.
225. Logistically, the government office tasked with investigating qui tam cases (the
Civil Fraud Section of United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C.) is even
housed in a completely different building than the Attorney General. The Attorney Gen-
eral's Office is located at 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530-0001.
See Department of Justice, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov (last visited Apr.
3, 2017). The Civil Fraud Section, which has nationwide authority over investigating qui
tam cases, moved outside of the Department of Justice's, main facility over fifteen years
ago while the author worked there, and is presently located at 601 D. Street, N.W., Wash-
ington, D.C. Fraud Section, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/civil/fraudsec
tion (last visited Apr. 3, 2017). The Fraud Section uses a post office box for qui tam com-
munication because it too receives such large quantity of mail that it wants to ensure that
it receives information timely. Contact Us, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov
/civil/con tact-us-9 (last visited Apr. 3, 2017).
226. Hesch, It Takes Time, supra note 1, at 917-18 (explaining the delegation process).
227. It is sufficient that the relator provide a draft of the complaint to the government
prior to filing it. See United States ex rel. Judd v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 73760, at *41 (D.N.J. May 30, 2014) (rejecting argument that submission of a dis-
closure statement, summarizing known material evidence and information related to the
complaint, did not meet the requirement of providing information on which allegations
were based prior to filing as "hyper-technical"); United States ex rel. Woods v. Southern-
Care, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141524, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2013) (finding it suf-
ficient to provide "information that includes any essential element of the fraudulent
scheme").
228. Before, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2010).
229. Government officials are not always interested in learning all of the details, espe-
cially when told that a qui tam is about to be filed. Therefore, it is not necessary to provide
all information to the government. It is sufficient to inform the government of the nature
of the fraud and provide as much detail as requested.
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III. RESTATING THE NEW PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR AND ORIGINAL
SOURCE EXCEPTION UNDER THE 2010 AMENDMENTS
This section restates the original source exception in order to
provide a uniform set of standards and guidance to the courts and
practitioners.
A. 2010 Public Disclosure Bar
The FCA allows relators to file a qui tam claim alleging fraud
against the government and to share in the proceeds.23 ° However,
the FCA also contains a public disclosure bar. The 2010 public
disclosure bar reads:
The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless
opposed by the Government, if substantially the same allegations or
transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly dis-
closed-(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in
which the Government or its agent is a party; (ii) in a congressional,
Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report, hearing,
audit, or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless the ac-
tion is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information.
The FCA's 2010 public disclosure bar provides for the dismissal
of a qui tam claim that brings "substantially the same allegations
or transactions" that were already publicly disclosed.232 The public
disclosure bar contains a three-part test: (1) whether there was a
qualifying public disclosure of allegations or transactions; (2)
whether the qui tam action contains "substantially the same alle-
gations or transactions;" and if so, (3) whether the government
objects or a relator qualifies as an "original source. '
To be considered a qualifying public disclosure, however, the
information must have been disclosed in one of the following
230. 31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(d) (2012).
231. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
232. Id.
233. See id.; see also Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex
rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 293 (2010) (applying a three-prong test under the 1986 public
disclosure bar, before the FCA was amended, to allow the government to object to dismis-
sal). In short, the public disclosure bar is triggered only by a qualifying public disclosure;
namely that the fraud was disclosed in one of the enumerated manners specified in this
provision. If there is no qualifying public disclosure prior to the filing of a qui tam com-
plaint, the relator need not meet the original source exception.
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sources: "a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in
which the Government or its agent is a party;" "a congressional,
Government Accountability Office, or' other Federal report, hear-
ing, audit, or investigation;" or "the news media.""' If information
exists in the public domain from any other source, it does not
trigger the public disclosure bar and cannot be considered under
the public disclosure bar. For instance, information on a company
website or information revealed in a lawsuit in which the gov-
ernment is not a party are not qualifying public disclosures and
cannot be considered as part of the public disclosure analysis. On-
ly information contained in a qualifying public disclosure may be
considered under the public disclosure bar."' In addition, for
"substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in
the action or claim" to be considered "publicly disclosed," the criti-
cal, or material elements of the allegations or transactions of the
qui tam complaint must appear in the public disclosure.236 That
means that the public disclosure must have either alleged fraud
with respect to the same allegations or transaction in the qui tam
complaint, or contain essential information about the same
transactions or allegations to reach the conclusion that a fraud
had occurred.237 In short, a qualifying public disclosure occurs on-
ly when the fraud is disclosed in one of the specifically enumerat-
ed manners identified in one of the sources listed within the FCA.
Even if there is a qualifying public disclosure, the government
may still block the public disclosure bar. The 2010 public disclo-
sure bar is not jurisdictional."' It authorizes the government to
oppose dismissal under the public disclosure bar.239 If the gov-
ernment notifies the court that it opposes dismissal based upon
234. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,
654 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Congress sought to prohibit qui tam actions only when either the
allegation of fraud or the critical elements of the fraudulent transaction themselves were
in the public domain.").
238. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Moore & Co., PA. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC,
812 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2016) (joining "the other circuits that have ruled that the
amended version does not set forth a jurisdictional bar"); United States ex rel. Osheroff v.
Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 2015) ("We conclude that the amended §
3730(e)(4) creates grounds for dismissal for failure to state a claim rather than for lack of
jurisdiction."); United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 916 (4th
Cir. 2013) ("It is apparent ... that the public-disclosure bar is no longer jurisdictional.").
239. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
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the public disclosure bar, the court must not dismiss the qui tam
claim based upon the public disclosure bar.2"' Under this condi-
tion, a relator need not satisfy the original source exception.
If the government does not file an objection, a relator may also
remain in the case if she qualifies as an original source.24'
B. 2010 Original Source Exception
The 2010 original source exception reads:
For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individu-
al who either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection
(e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the infor-
mation on which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or
[ii] who has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to
the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has vol-
untarily provided the information to the Government before filing an
action under this section.242
To qualify as an original source, a relator must have either (a)
reported the fraud allegations prior to the qualifying public dis-
closure, or (b) provided the government with information that is
independent from and materially adds to the information con-
tained in the public disclosure.2 Thus, the FCA provides two dis-
tinct ways of satisfying the original source exception to the public
disclosure bar. A relator only needs to satisfy one of these stand-
ards to be an original source.
1. The First Original Source Exception: Disclosure to the
Government Prior to a Qualifying Public Disclosure
A relator satisfies the first original source exception if she "vol-
untarily disclosed to the Government the information on which
allegations or transactions in a claim are based" prior to a quali-
fying public disclosure.24 This involves a four-prong test: the dis-
closure must be made (1) prior to a qualifying public disclosure;
(2) to the government; (3) voluntarily; and (4) with information on
240. See id.
241. See id.
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which the allegations or transactions in a claim are based.245
When all four are satisfied, a relator is an original source under
this subpart.
2 46
The principal requirement under this standard is that a relator
disclosed her allegations prior to a qualifying public disclosure.
The test is straightforward: a relator qualifies as an original
source if she discloses information about the fraud before a quali-
fying public disclosure occurred. 7 It does not matter whether or
not a relator was aware of any prior public disclosure. To qualify
under this standard, she must disclose information to the gov-
ernment alleging fraud before a qualifying public disclosure. Even
if a relator had first-hand knowledge of the fraud, if there had al-
ready been a prior qualifying public disclosure before she contact-
ed the government, she would not meet this standard and would
need to qualify under the alternative exception.
Next, the disclosure must have been made to the government.2 8
It is not sufficient that a relator tell the news media, her employ-
er, or others of the fraud; the disclosure must be to the govern-
ment prior to a qualifying public disclosure. The manner in which
a relator informs the government is not important. For instance,
she may call a government hotline, write a letter, or meet in per-
son with a government employee. A relator need not contact the
Attorney General or any of the various United States Attorneys.
Rather, under this provision the "government" includes any gov-
ernment employee or official.24 '9 Accordingly, this element is met if
a relator informs any government official of the fraud allegations
prior to a qualifying public disclosure.
In addition, the disclosure to the government must have been
voluntary.5 "Voluntary" simply means that a relator was not le-
gally compelled to provide the information.251 It is not considered
voluntary if a relator was required to provide the information





249. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
250. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
251. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
252. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
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On the other hand, it is still considered voluntary even if a gov-
ernment investigator initiated the conversation.25 In short, pro-
vided that a relator elects to cooperate and disclose information
regarding the fraud, it is considered voluntary as long as she was
not compelled to provide the information.
Finally, the information that a relator provides to the govern-
ment prior to any qualifying public disclosure must include in-
formation on which the allegations or transactions in a claim are
based.254 This element is not intended to be onerous. Rather, it
simply requires that the relator disclose the basis for a fraud al-
legation. A relator need not, however, include every piece of
knowledge or even every element of a false claim. It is sufficient
that a relator intended her report to say that the defendant was
cheating or committing fraud and that she disclosed the fraud al-
legations to the government prior to a qualifying public disclo-
sure.25 The purpose of this new method of obtaining an original
source exception is to reward relators that approach the govern-
ment with fraud allegations prior to a qualifying public disclo-
sure. A relator's status is sealed if she approached the govern-
ment prior to the public disclosure, and it does not depend upon
revealing every detail of the fraud. It is sufficient if a relator de-
scribes the fraud scheme.2"6
2. The Second Original Source Exception: Independent of and
Materially Adds to a Qualifying Public Disclosure
If a relator does not disclose the fraud allegations to the gov-
ernment prior to a qualifying public disclosure, she may still be
considered an original source if she possesses knowledge that is
"independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed al-
legations or transactions" and that she "has voluntarily provided
the information to the Government before filing" the qui tam
complaint.27 This involves a three-prong test: (1) a relator's
knowledge is independent of the qualifying public disclosure; (2)
253. Id.
254. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B).
255. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM ACTIONS § 4.02(B) (4th ed.
2016).
256. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
257. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)(2).
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her information materially adds to the publicly disclosed allega-
tions or transactions; and (3) she voluntarily provided this infor-
mation to the government prior to filing a qui tam action."'
Knowledge that is "independent of... the publicly disclosed al-
legations or transactions" means that a relator cannot derive her
knowledge from any of the qualifying sources listed in the public
disclosure bar located in § 3730(e)(4)(A)"9 In other words, the
qualifying public disclosure cannot be the source of a relator's
knowledge.6 A relator has the burden of establishing the manner
or means of acquiring the information in order to show that her
knowledge was derived independent of the public disclosure.26'
This element is not intended to exclude a relator merely because
she is alleging the same fraud scheme as noted in a qualifying
public disclosure. Rather, this exception only bars a relator when
she cannot demonstrate that she obtained the information inde-
pendent of a qualifying public disclosure.262 In addition, the origi-
nal source exception no longer requires that a relator have "di-
rect" knowledge of the fraud. Therefore, she can learn of the fraud
through any sources other than a qualifying public disclosure.268
For instance, a relator satisfies this element if she learns of the
fraud from an employee of the wrongdoer or even through a pub-
lic lawsuit in which the government was not a party. On the other
hand, if a relator cannot show that she obtained the information
apart from a qualifying public disclosure, this element is not met.
A relator must also demonstrate that her knowledge "material-
ly adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions."'264
This focuses upon the value of the information. At the same time,
however, it is not meant to block out a relator simply because
there has been a public disclosure that contains similar allega-
258. See id.
259. Id.
260. Id.; see also Cause of Action v. Chi. Transit Auth., 815 F.3d 267, 283 (7th Cir.
2016).
261. Stennett v. Premier Rehab., LLC, 479 F. App'x 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2012).
262. Id.
263. In addition, a relator does not need to show that she had knowledge of the fraud
prior to the public disclosure to meet this element; only that she learned of the fraud inde-
pendent from the disclosure. At the same time, if she knew of the fraud prior to a qualify-
ing public disclosure, it would establish that she did not learn of it through a qualifying
public disclosure.
264. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)(2) (2012).
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tions. A relator qualifies as an original source if she brings some-
thing to the table that adds value... or improves the quality of the
qualifying public disclosure.266 It adds value if it "contribute[s]
significant additional information . . . so as to improve its quali-
ty. '' 267 Knowledge that is considered material can relate to any es-
sential element of an FCA claim, and includes improving the
quality of essential factual background, such as additional details
regarding "the who, what, when, where and how of the events at
issue.,,268 A relator also materially adds value when her knowledge
significantly enlarges the scope of the case.269 For example, if the
publicly disclosed information reveals fraud at one hospital in a
chain, and a relator brings forth evidence that it is also occurring
at another location, that would also materially add to the disclo-
sure.
Regardless of how well defined the fraud allegations are in a
qualifying public disclosure, when a relator brings forth
knowledge of scienter that is not specifically contained in a quali-
fying public disclosure, it is presumed to materially add value.
Because of the critical need and crucial role scienter plays in FCA
cases, a relator who brings new evidence demonstrating that the
defendant knowingly submitted a false claim prima facie meets
this standard. For instance, if a relator attended a meeting in
which a supervisor discussed the fraud scheme, then it would
significantly add to the allegations, provided the information from
the same meeting was not already publicly disclosed.
Finally, the statute contains a requirement that a relator "has
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before
265. United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d
294, 306 (3d Cir. 2016).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 307 (quoting In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 217
(3d Cir. 2002)).
269. By itself, merely adding a larger time period or geographic area to an already well-
defined fraud allegation, however, may not meet the materially added standard. Yet, if the
publicly disclosed fraud is not well-defined or does not contain significant details, then
adding new transactions or occurrences would materially add value. "As the level of detail
in public disclosures increases, the universe of potentially material additions shrinks."
United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211 (1st Cir.
2016). Conversely, the smaller the level of detail in a qualifying public disclosure, the more
readily a court should find that a relator's knowledge of additional facts or details materi-
ally adds to the disclosure.
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filing" a qui tam action.7' A relator voluntarily provides infor-
mation when she has not been compelled by a subpoena or given
the information only in exchange for a grant of immunity or as
part of a criminal plea deal.27' The author argues that information
should also be considered voluntarily provided when given in re-
sponse to an interview initiated by the government as part of an
ongoing investigation.272 The definition of "voluntarily" does not
hinge upon who initiated the meeting.273 Rather, "voluntarily"
means being made of a person's "own free choice" and without be-
ing compelled.274 Accordingly, this element should be met absent a
relator having been compelled, such as a subpoena or plea agree-
ment requiring that the information be produced.
The statute also has language appearing to require a relator to
notify the government of the fraud allegations before filing the qui
tam complaint.7 Assuming that this is an enforceable require-
ment,7 s a relator's disclosure may occur at any time before filing
270. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B)(2) (2012).
271. See United States ex rel. Repko v. Guthrie Clinic, P.C., 490 F. App'x 502, 503 (3d
Cir. 2012) (finding the information was not voluntary because providing the information
was part of a plea deal that compelled disclosure); United States ex rel. Paranich v.
Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 340 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding the information provided in response
to a subpoena was not voluntary).
272. The few courts that have addressed this issue have reached opposite results. See
United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 704 (8th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that relator who responded to HUD investigator's interview questions did not volun-
tarily provide information to the Government before filing suit); United States v. McMah-
on, No. 11-CV-4620, 2016 WL 5404598, at *10 (N.D. 111. Sept. 28, 2016). However, those
courts approached this issue from the wrong perspective. The plain language of the stat-
ute, which only requires voluntariness, does not permit a policy argument that timeliness
is a factor, let alone dispositive in defining the term voluntary. There are other FCA provi-
sions that address timeliness, such as the first to file bar and the triggering of the public
disclosure bar. In addition, this particular original source exception has other safeguards
regarding the usefulness of the information, i.e., it must materially add to the public in-
formation. Assuming there is not a pending FCA case and the information being provided
by the relator materially adds to the public disclosure, Congress has spoken that the rela-
tor shall be allowed to proceed provided she voluntarily provided the new information to
the government. The plain language of the Act and definition of the term voluntarily
leaves no room to treat the decision of a relator to choose to disclose material evidence to a
government investigator as anything other than voluntarily.
273. In addition, it is not necessary that the relator know at the time of providing the
information that the FCA offers rewards for filing qui tam actions.
274. Voluntary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vol
untarily (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
275. As discussed earlier, any requirement to notify the government prior to filing a
qui tam case does not serve any useful purpose and should not be considered a jurisdic-
tional requirement.
276. The author suggests that this is not a material requirement and should not be
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the qui tam suit, even a moment prior to filing the qui tam com-
plaint. The term "before" means prior to or preceding,2 77 which
signifies the order in which events should occur, but not the
length of time between events. Therefore, a relator satisfies this
aspect of the original source exception if she notifies the govern-
ment of fraud allegations at any time before filing the qui tam
complaint. Because the FCA does not impose any actual length of
time requirements for such disclosures, neither should a court.
CONCLUSION
Because the government is ill-equipped to detect fraud, Con-
gress pays whistleblower rewards for reporting fraud against the
government. The FCA's qui tam provisions prove to be the most
effective method of combatting fraud against the government and
account for 70 percent of all fraud recoveries gained through cas-
es pursued by the government.17 To avoid needlessly paying
awards when the government is already hot on the trail of fraud,
however, in 1986, Congress inserted into the qui tam provisions a
public disclosure bar.279 The public disclosure bar prevents paying
an award when fraud allegations have already been publicly dis-
closed in certain ways specified in the FCA prior to a relator filing
a qui tam complaint. At the same time, Congress recognized that
there remain valid reasons for enlisting a relator in certain cir-
cumstances even when the public disclosure bar is triggered.28 °
Thus, in 1986, Congress also added an "original source" exception
to the public disclosure bar if the whistleblower had "direct and
independent knowledge" of the fraud.28' The courts were divided
in determining the meaning of these requirements2.2 and some
courts too narrowly closed the door.
considered jurisdictional because it is not consistent with the purpose or intent of this new
provision.
277. Before, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICT1ONARY (3rd ed. 2010).
278. See supra note 6.
279. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3157 (codi-
fied as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012)).
280. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 12 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5277.
281. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3157 (codi-
fied as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2012)).
282. Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 114.
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In 2010, Congress amended both the public disclosure bar and
the original source exception of the FCA to loosen the require-
ments in order to find the right balance between attracting whis-
tleblowers and not paying rewards when the government was al-
ready pursuing fraud.2" In addition to clarifying that a qualifying
public disclosure does not include information learned in discov-
ery in cases not involving the federal government, Congress pro-
vided that the government could waive the public disclosure bar
altogether.284 With respect to the original source status, Congress
rewrote the original source exception. The 2010 original source
exception can basically be met in one of two ways: either (1) a re-
lator told the government about the fraud before a qualifying
public disclosure, or (2) a relator's information is independent of
and materially adds to the publicly available information.28
Since 2010, only a handful of circuit courts have ruled on cer-
tain aspects of the new original source exception, but there re-
mains considerable question and need for a uniform standard.
For instance, the courts were split over the term "independent
knowledge" from the 1986 version28 and are already divided over
the meaning of the 2010 requirement that knowledge be "inde-
pendent of' the public disclosure.287 In addition, the FCA did not
define "materially adds" and the courts have not developed a full
or uniform standard.2" Therefore, this article addresses the
boundaries and application of the 2010 version of the original
source exception. It outlines the statutory framework for meeting
the 2010 original source exception, including a discussion of how
the courts have been interpreting these new provisions. Because
qui tam cases remain the most important anti-fraud tool, assur-
ing that it is properly interpreted and applied is critical. There-
fore, the last section of this article concisely restates the entire
original source exception in order to provide a uniform standard
and guidance to the courts and practitioners when interpreting
the 2010 amendments.
283. Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 15, at 230.
284. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 901
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012)).
285. 124 Stat. 901-02 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012)).
286. See Hesch, Restating the "Original Source Exception," supra note 17, at 125 (dis-
cussing different circuits' interpretations of "independent knowledge").
287. See supra Part II.B.2(a).
288. See supra Part II.B.2(b).
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